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Injury & Tort Law

[11/20] Hukic v. Aurora Loan Serv.
In plaintiff's suit against defendants claiming breach of contract, tortious interference, and violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, arising from a six-figure mortgage he obtained at an interest rate of 10.65% where he was to make monthly payments as well as taxes, insurance premiums and other charges and fees, summary judgment in defendants' favor and dismissal of plaintiff's claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress is affirmed because plaintiff did not comply with the terms of his agreement that required him to submit proof of payment.

[11/19] Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV Park, LLC
In plaintiff's suit against the defendant-Mobile Park for refusing to permit the installation of a new mobile home in its mobile home park to replace an older one that plaintiff had inherited, trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit is affirmed where: 1) the complaint fails to state a cause of action for statutory violation; 2) the complaint fails to state a tort cause of action for interference with contract; 3) the complaint fails to state a contract cause of action; and 4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.

[11/19] Johnson v. Honeywell Int'l Inc.
In plaintiff's suit against the defendants arising from injuries he sustained as an HVAC technician while working on defendants' air conditioning equipment, trial court's judgment in favor of defendants is reversed as the sophisticated user defense applies to the negligence cause of action, but not to the strict liability cause of action.

[11/19] Kelly v. CB&I Constructors, Inc.
In plaintiff's suit against the defendant for sparking a brush fire that caused a significant damage to his ranch, judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part where: 1) defendant forfeited any error in the jury's verdict form; 2) jury's award of restoration damages in excess of the property's value was supported by substantial evidence and was not excessive as a matter of law; 3) the undisputed evidence established that plaintiff did not reside on the property at the time of the trespass, and his storage of personal property there was not the type of "occupancy" that would justify his recovery of annoyance and discomfort damages; 4) tree damage caused by a negligently spread fire is wrongful injury to trees caused by a trespass subject to mandatory doubling pursuant to Civil Code section 3346, notwithstanding the general provision governing fire damage in Health and Safety Code section 13007; and 5) substantial evidence supported trial court's finding that plaintiff intended to use the property for raising livestock, entitling him to an award of attorney's fees under Code of Civ. Proc. section 1021.9.

[11/19] Jennings v. Jones
In plaintiff's civil rights case against the state of Rhode Island and a State Police representative and other police officers who had executed a search warrant of his workplace at the Narrangansett Indian Tribe "smoke shop", jury's verdict in favor of defendant in the second trial is affirmed as: 1) there was no abuse of discretion in granting a new trial based on the ground that, even if the jury verdict had unambiguously rested on the increased force theory, that theory would have been contrary to the weight of the evidence; and 2) there was no waiver of the new trial motion by defendant.

[11/18] Cell Therapeutics Inc. v. Lash Group Inc.
In an action for indemnification based on the settlement of an underlying suit against plaintiff for violations of the False Claims Act (FCA), judgment on the pleadings for defendant is reversed where: 1) the facts articulated in plaintiff's complaint were sufficient to state a claim for damages independent of the question of plaintiff's liability under the FCA; and 2) the district court erred in characterizing the settlement as effectively establishing FCA liability and thus barring the claims against defendant.

[11/18] US ex rel Ondis v. City of Woonsocket
In plaintiff's qui tam action against a city under the False Claims Act claiming that the city had defrauded the federal government by making false statements to the Department of Housing and Urban Development when applying for federal grants, dismissal of the case is affirmed where the was no error in a conclusion that the FCA's public disclosure bar applied to divest the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over the action as: 1) the city's alleged misrepresentation and what the plaintiff alleges was the city's true plan were sufficiently in the public domain to ground an inference of fraud; 2) the public disclosure occurred in the manner specified in the statute; 3) plaintiff's suit is based upon those publicly disclosed allegations or transactions; 4) plaintiff does not qualify for the original source exception; and 5) district court did not err in precluding certain testimony during an evidentiary hearing.

[11/17] Nutragenetics, LLC v. Sup. Ct.
In plaintiff's suit against the defendants alleging he was defrauded into investing in their company, defendants' petition for writ of mandate is denied as trial court properly found plaintiff's peremptory challenge to the judge to be timely where: 1) the second lawsuit involves a different defendant and different causes of action asserted against that defendant; and 2) the second lawsuit does not arise from conduct in, or involve enforcement or modification of an order in, the first lawsuit.

[11/17] Merrill v. Leslie Controls, Inc.
In plaintiffs' products liability suit against defendants for injuries caused by exposure to asbestos-containing products aboard US Navy vessels, trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiffs is reversed in where: 1) plaintiffs have not shown that defendant manufactured, supplied, or distributed the products which caused his exposure to asbestos; and 2) defendant is not liable in strict liability for failing to warn of the dangerous properties of those products or for a design defect in those products.

[11/16] Montalvo v. Gonzalez-Amparo
In an action alleging malpractice by plaintiff's deceased mother's medical care providers, dismissal of the suit as time-barred is vacated and remanded where: 1) the date of accrual for plaintiff's personal claim was within the one-year statute of limitations; and 2) under 32 L.P.R.A. section 255, plaintiff is entitled to bring her mother's medical malpractice claim because it was brought within one year of her mother's death.

[11/16] Longaberger Co. v. Kolt
In an action by an ERISA governed, self-funded employee welfare benefit plan seeking to enforce the terms of the Plan's reimbursement provisions against defendant-attorney and his client who had recovered tort settlement funds, summary judgment for plaintiff-plan is affirmed where: 1) the district court correctly granted plaintiff equitable restitution as authorized by section 502(a)(3) of ERISA; 2) defendant's judicial estoppel argument fails as it is not applicable where a party argues an inconsistent position based on a change in controlling law; 3) district court ruled correctly that the Plan was self-executing and that the Plan language provides for an automatic and valid lien on the settlement funds to the extent of the benefits defendant's client received from the Plan; and 4) defendant is obligated to reimburse the Plan from the funds he received from liable third parties, and his decision to commingle these funds and not maintain them intact does not prevent enforcement of plaintiff's equitable lien by agreement under the terms of its ERISA plan.

[11/13] Wagner v. Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc.
In a tort action arising out of a motorcycle crash, denial of defendant's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law is reversed where: 1) a plaintiff may not establish wanton conduct by satisfying the notice or knowledge element of the tort as to one risk -- e.g., a broad generalized risk —- and the second element of indifference of that risk to a differently defined risk —- e.g., the specific risk that caused the accident at issue; and 2) even if plaintiff had put on evidence that defendant knew that a certain part of the motorcycle race at issue was dangerous, plaintiff did not show that defendant was "completely indifferent" to that danger.

[11/12] Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co.
In an action for insurance coverage for a malpractice lawsuit, summary judgment for defendant is affirmed where: 1) the alleged acts of malpractice in a letter sent to the malpractice defendant and the lawsuit were "connected by an inevitable or predictable interrelation or sequence of events" for purposes of the policy; 2) the insurance policy treated as one claim all "related wrongful acts"; and 3) because defendant had no legally cognizable duty to defend or indemnify a claim, plaintiffs' bad faith claim could not survive.

[11/12] Cassel v. Sup. Ct.
In plaintiff's legal malpractice suit, his request for writ of relief from two orders excluding evidence in favor of his former attorneys is granted and the orders vacated as the communications are a client and his attorney, outside the presence of, and not otherwise communicated to, any opposing party or the mediator, and reveal nothing said or done in the mediation discussion.

[11/10] Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co.
In plaintiff's wrongful death suit against the defendant, arising from an accident where a pickup truck driven by plaintiff's deceased husband collided with a tractor-trailer driven by defendant's employee, a jury verdict for plaintiff is reversed and remanded where: 1) as a matter of law, the employee owed no duty to the decedent to avoid stopping in the emergency parking area; 2) the employee's negligence did not proximately cause the accident, and notwithstanding the conclusion that the record does not contain substantial evidence that the employee's negligent act or omission caused plaintiff's injuries, plaintiff cannot recover against defendant based on the facts in the record as a matter of public policy; and 3) the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of plaintiff's expert on causation and as such, the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.

[11/10] Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd. v. Sup. Ct.
In plaintiffs' suit against the defendant-Cruise Line brought under the California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), the False Advertising Law (FAL), and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), over charges added to the price of shore excursions taken during a cruise, trial court's order denying defendant's motion for summary judgment is vacated and remanded where: 1) trial court erred in concluding that the CLRA cause of action was barred by Civil Code 1781(c); 2) a plaintiff asserting UCL, FAL and CLRA must show that he or she relied on the defendant's misrepresentations; 3) plaintiffs did not rely on any representations made by defendants; 4) there are no material questions of fact about the cost of excursions.

[11/10] Jackson v. Yarbray
In plaintiffs' malicious prosecution action against defendants involving an ealier case that arose from unsuccessful efforts to merge with businesses owned by defendants, trial court's finding that defendants are liable for the malicious prosecution of a civil action and award of $700,000 in general damages for emotional distress and $2.41 million in punitive damages to plaintiffs is affirmed in part and reversed in part where: 1) the judgment as to defendant's counsel who had represented them for part of the time the action was pending is affirmed in its entirety as the trial court did not err in concluding plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving counsel had acted with malice; 2) portion of the judgment awarding compensatory damages is reversed in part and remanded to determine the amount of attorney fees and costs properly recoverable as special damages by the plaintiffs as the trial court erred in precluding any recovery by the plaintiffs for attorney fees incurred in defending the underlying action; and 3) judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all other respects.

[11/09] Jones v. Byrnes
In plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action against two police officers on behalf of the estate of her husband arising from a high speed chase of armed robbery suspects that killed her husband in an automobile crash, summary judgment in favor of the defendant police officers is affirmed where: 1) the estate did not establish a prima facie case of deprivation of the husband's substantive due process rights as officers' actions of trying to apprehend what they reasonably believed to be dangerous criminals do not shock the conscience; and 2) in the alternative, even if the officers' actions did rise to the level of violating the husband's constitutional rights, it was not clearly established at the time of the incident that actions of that sort crossed the constitutional line.

[11/06] Doe v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego
In fifteen plaintiffs' statewide clergy sex abuse case against defendants, trial court's order sustaining defendants' demurrers without leave to amend is affirmed as childhood sexual molestation victims whose claims were time barred before January 1, 2003, had to sue during the ensuing one-year revival period regardless of whether they had yet discovered the link between the earlier abuse and their adult outset of psychological injuries from that abuse.

[11/06] Joseph v. Johnson
In plaintiffs' suit against defendant for damages arising out of their sexual molestation by defendant's husband, trial court's judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part where: 1) trial court properly sustained the demurrer with regard to plaintiffs' second and fifth causes of action for negligence; but 2) trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to plaintiffs' third and sixth causes of action for intentional misconduct.

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