Health Law
[11/20]
Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phiadelphia Bd. of Educ.
In plaintiffs' suit against a school district on behalf of their daughter who suffers from cognitive and developmental disorders alleging that the district's failure to provide their daughter with appropriate eduction obstructed her intellectual growth, summary judgment for defendant favor is affirmed for the most part but a portion of its ruling is vacated and remanded where: 1) district court erred in determining that the plaintiffs do not have standing to pursue their Individuals with Disabilities Education Act claim; and 2) plaintiffs did not waive their right to proceed directly under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
[11/19]
Fleming v. Yuma Reg. Med. Ctr.
In an action for employment discrimination based on plaintiff's disability, summary judgment for defendant is reversed where Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. section 794, extends to a claim of discrimination brought by an independent contractor because the Rehabilitation Act covers all individuals "subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
[11/19]
Kelly v. CB&I Constructors, Inc.
In plaintiff's suit against the defendant for sparking a brush fire that caused a significant damage to his ranch, judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part where: 1) defendant forfeited any error in the jury's verdict form; 2) jury's award of restoration damages in excess of the property's value was supported by substantial evidence and was not excessive as a matter of law; 3) the undisputed evidence established that plaintiff did not reside on the property at the time of the trespass, and his storage of personal property there was not the type of "occupancy" that would justify his recovery of annoyance and discomfort damages; 4) tree damage caused by a negligently spread fire is wrongful injury to trees caused by a trespass subject to mandatory doubling pursuant to Civil Code section 3346, notwithstanding the general provision governing fire damage in Health and Safety Code section 13007; and 5) substantial evidence supported trial court's finding that plaintiff intended to use the property for raising livestock, entitling him to an award of attorney's fees under Code of Civ. Proc. section 1021.9.
[11/17]
Couch v. Bd. of Trustees of Mem. Hosp. of Carbon County
In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action alleging that defendant-hospital board deprived plaintiff-physician of his First Amendment right of free speech through a campaign of retaliation against him for speaking out about substance abuse at the hospital, summary judgment for defendants is affirmed where neither the hospital's investigation of plaintiff nor its warning letter to him constituted an adverse employment action for First Amendment purposes.
[11/17]
Brown v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc.
In an ERISA action based on the discontinuation of plaintiff's long-term disability (LTD) benefits, summary judgment for defendant is affirmed in part where defendant-insurer could not be held liable for statutory penalties because 29 U.S.C. section 1132(c) only provided a cause of action against plan administrators. However, the order is reversed in part where defendant's failure to comply with its duty under section 1133(2) to provide plaintiff with "a reasonable opportunity for a full and fair review" of defendant's decision to discontinue plaintiff's LTD benefits excused plaintiff's failure to exhaust before bringing suit under section 1132(a).
[11/16]
Langhorne v. Sup. Ct.
Petitions for writ of mandate challenging trial court's denial of petitioners' motions to dismiss recommitment petitions, brought after the trial court granted People's motions to convert petitioners' involuntary two-year commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) to an indeterminate term under the 2006 amendment to the SVPA, are denied where: 1) substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the People made a good faith mistake of law when they failed to timely file the recommitment petitions before the expirations of petitioners' most recent two-year commitment periods; 2) the good-faith exception of section 6601(a)(2) precludes dismissal of the untimely recommitment petitions because petitioners' unlawful custody was due to People's mistake of law; and 3) therefore, the trial court properly denied petitioners' motions to dismiss and the court has jurisdiction to proceed on the petitions.
[11/16]
Montalvo v. Gonzalez-Amparo
In an action alleging malpractice by plaintiff's deceased mother's medical care providers, dismissal of the suit as time-barred is vacated and remanded where: 1) the date of accrual for plaintiff's personal claim was within the one-year statute of limitations; and 2) under 32 L.P.R.A. section 255, plaintiff is entitled to bring her mother's medical malpractice claim because it was brought within one year of her mother's death.
[11/13]
Gelson's Markets, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board's decision and award finding the employer liable for discrimination against an industrially injured employee because the employer did not accept a physician's release to allow the employee to return to work is annulled as the employee did not establish a prima facie showing of employer's liability for discrimination in violation of Labor Code section 132a, and as such, the burden did not shift to the employer to establish an affirmative defense.
[11/13]
Kovach v. Zurich American Ins. Co.
In plaintiff's ERISA suit against an insurance company for denying his claim for dismemberment benefits arising from a drunk-driving motorcycle accident, summary judgment for defendant-plan administrator is reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs where: 1) defendant's decision to deny benefits to the plaintiffs was contrary to the everyday meaning of the word "accidental" as it would be understood by a typical policyholder, and was based almost entirely on a body of largely distinguishable district court cases; 2) plaintiff's injuries were not "highly likely to occur" as a result of his intoxication, in contrast to the injuries that were highly likely to occur under the facts in Lennon; 3) defendant's interpretation of the Plan's provisions amounts to an additional, unwritten exclusion for all drunk-driving injuries, which is not permitted under even the most deferential standard of review; and 4) defendant's denial of coverage based on plaintiff's injuries being non-accidental was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious.
[11/12]
Thornton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.
In plaintiff's disability discrimination action against his former employer under the ADA, summary judgment for defendant is affirmed where: 1) the district court correctly determined that the allegations of discrimination encompassed by his 2001 Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) charge placed a limitation on the claims plaintiff can present now, and as such, plaintiff could only pursue his action with respect to alleged acts of discrimination that occurred in the 300-day window preceding his 2001 MCAD charge; and 2) the district court correctly determined that, assuming the 2001 MCAD complaint was properly limited, plaintiff's remaining allegations did not support his claims of violations of the ADA.
[11/10]
Kersey v. Wash. Metro. Area Trans. Auth.
In a disability discrimination action alleging that defendant transit authority's refusal to promote plaintiff was the consequence of discrimination and retaliation, summary judgment for defendant is affirmed where defendant came forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for refusing to promote plaintiff to positions that required driving: to wit, the provision of a prior settlement agreement stating that "under no circumstance will plaintiff be permitted to operate an authority vehicle."
[11/09]
Louie v. BFS Retail & Commercial Operations, LLC
In plaintiff's suit against defendants for violations of California's Disabled Persons Act (DPA), alleging the countertops in defendant's business establishments were allegedly too high to allow wheelchair access, dismissal pursuant to defendant's demurrer is reversed where, because a Florida federal case was resolved by a consent decree expressly reserving any damage claims, res judicata does not bar this claim for damages.
[11/06]
Sell v. US Dep't. of Justice
In an action alleging that plaintiff was the victim of medical malpractice that occurred while he was in federal custody awaiting trial, dismissal of the action on statute of limitations grounds is affirmed where: 1) plaintiff's mental illness did not prevent him from discovering the alleged injury; and 2) the continuous treatment doctrine did not toll the statute.
[11/04]
Crawford v. Astrue
In consolidated appeals from fee awards to attorneys who successfully represented Social Security Disability Insurance claimants in federal court under contingent-fee contracts, the awards are vacated where the district court failed to follow the mandate of Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002), in determining the fee awards.
[11/04]
Petersen v. Reisch
In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action by a prisoner alleging inadequate medical treatment, defendants' appeal from a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is dismissed where the district court's order did not in fact resolve the qualified immunity issue and was purely administrative in nature, and therefore was not appealable.
[11/04]
Miller v. Nichols
In plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to the state's removal of their child after termination proceedings and motion for injunctive relief to prevent a foster family's adoption of the child, district court's dismissal of the case is affirmed where: 1) the district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief to prevent the child's adoption pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and 2) the factual issues underlying plaintiffs' claims were addressed by the state court and are barred by issue preclusion.
[11/02]
Rasenack v. AIG Life Ins. Co.
In an ERISA action against an insurer seeking disability benefits, summary judgment for defendant is reversed where: 1) the administrator failed to render a final decision within the time limits prescribed by the benefit plan and ERISA; and 2) the insurer's references to hemiparesis and the conclusions of the reviewing physicians did not provide a sufficient grounds for the denial of plaintiff's claim.
[11/02]
In re: Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig.
In a product liability action against hormone therapy manufacturers, partial judgment for plaintiff and for defendants is affirmed in part where: 1) plaintiff's Arkansas law claims were not preempted because there was no evidence that the FDA would not have permitted the strengthening of the labels of the drugs at issue in a manner consistent with Arkansas law; 2) plaintiff's expert testimony on causation was properly admitted because the expert ruled out other possible causes of plaintiff's disease; 3) the district court's instruction on proximate cause was correct; and 4) judgment for defendants on punitive damages was correct because defendants did not act with recklessness or malice.
[11/02]
People v. McRoberts
Trial court's order committing defendant to a state hospital for an indeterminate term of treatment and confinement is affirmed where: 1) trial court was correct in applying section 6600.1, of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), to defendant's juvenile adjudication for child molestation, as the government satisfied this element of an SVPA commitment; 2) trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of his lay witnesses; and 3) court did not err in refusing defendant's request for an instruction requiring the jury to find it was necessary to keep him in a secure facility for the protection of the health and safety of others.
[10/30]
Brown v. City of Pittsburgh
In a First Amendment case against the city of Pittsburgh challenging the constitutionality of an ordinance establishing two types of zones limiting speech around health care facilities, district court's judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, dismissed in part, and remanded where: 1) district court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief with respect to plaintiff's facial challenge is reversed; 2) the combination of the ordinance's "buffer" and "bubble" zones is invalid but either zone, individually, is valid on its face; 3) district court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief with respect to plaintiff's claim of selective enforcement is affirmed but vacated with respect to her claim that the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to particular clinic locations; and 4) plaintiff's appeal from the district court's order partially dismissing her complaint is dismissed.
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